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Recent Decisions
the courts will go in their implication of warranties. For instance, how
long does the vendor remain liable? The purchaser of a home often con-
siders it a lifetime investment. Is he entitled to a lifetime guarantee?29
While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided that a house
must also be a home, builders will want more certainty than this deci-
sion leaves them.
John A. Knorr
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL-INDIGENT
MISDEMEANANT-The United States Supreme Court has held that ab-
sent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person can suffer a "loss of
liberty" regardless of the categorization of the criminal offense or the
maximum imposable punishment unless he has been represented by
counsel at his trial.
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
John Richard Argersinger, an indigent, was convicted of carrying a
concealed weapon, an offense which could be punished by a maximum
of six months imprisonment, a fine of $1000, or both. In a trial before
a judge he was convicted and sentenced to serve 90 days. Petitioner
instituted a habeas corpus proceeding in the Supreme Court of Florida
contending that he was unrepresented by counsel and as a layman, he
was incapable of establishing adequate defenses to the charge." The
court denied the writ holding that, at most, the right to appointed
counsel in a state criminal prosecution is no more extensive than the
corresponding right to a jury trial. 2 Since petitioner would not have
been entitled to a trial by jury because the maximum punishment
was less than six months, fourteenth amendment due process did not
require the appointment of counsel in his behalf.3 The court recog-
nized that there would inevitably be an expansion of the right to ap-
pointed counsel beyond the "felony standard" annunciated in Gideon
29. In one case, the court held the vendor liable to a second owner for faulty construc-
tion nine years after the home was completed. Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal.
App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969).
1. Agersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1970).
2. Id. at 443.
3. Id. at 444.
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v. Wainwright.4 Instead of adjudicating the merits of petitioner's
claims, the court attempted to determine to what extent the United
States Supreme Court would subsequently expand the right to ap-
pointed counsel and whether petitioner's penalty would have come
within the scope of that standard.5 The court was influenced by the
denial of certiorari in misdemeanor cases by the Supreme Court as in-
dicative of that Court's reluctance to extend the right to appointed
counsel in such cases even though substantial terms of imprisonment
were involved.6 In effect the court declared that this fundamental guar-
antee of the sixth amendment is required to insure a fair proceeding
only when the accused faces imprisonment of more than 180 days.7 The
court felt that felonies and misdemeanors have similar punitive aspects,
namely fine and imprisonment, yet only in regard to the former does
the accused suffer a forfeiture of civil rights, (such as the right to vote
and to hold public office) and experience difficulties in obtaining sub-
sequent employment. s Although the Fifth Circuit had adopted a "loss
of liberty" standard for the appointment of counsel, 9 the state court
concluded that only the indigent misdemeanant who is deprived of his
liberty for more than six months will be subject to the foregoing
criminal, civil and social sanctions to a degree which warrants the ap-
plication of the safeguards of the sixth amendment. 10
4. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In Gideon, the petitioner had been convicted of breaking and
entering a poolroom with the intent to commit a misdemeanor, a felony under Florida
law. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction holding that all indigents accused of
felonies will henceforth be entitled to the assistance of counsel in state criminal prosecu-
tions to insure that their convictions are in accord with due process of law.
5. 236 So. 2d at 443.
6. Winters v. Beck, 239 Ark. 1151, 397 S.W.2d 364 (1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 907
(1966). Petitioner was convicted of a misdemeanor, sentenced to 30 days and fined $254.
The latter penalty was subsequently converted to an additional 254 days when petitioner
failed to pay the fine. The'decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas was in conflict with
the understanding of the right to counsel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
which rejected the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors. See McDonald v. Moore,
353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965); .DeJoseph v. Connecticut, 3 Conn. Cir. 624, 222 A.2d 752
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 982 (1966). Petitioner was found guilty of non-support and sentenced
to a year's imprisonment without the assistance of counsel which he had requested. The
decision of the Supreme Court of Connecticut was in conflict with that of the First
District Court for the District of Connecticut. See Arbo v. Hegstrom, 261 F. Supp. 397 (D.
Conn. 1966).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), defines.petty offense as any misdemeanor, the penalty for which
does not exceed imprisonment for six months or a fine of not more than $500 or both.
The Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970), adopted this standard for the appoint-
ment of counsel in misdemeanor cases in federal courts.
8. 236 So. 2d at 444.
9. James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969) (counsel must be provided in any
state or federal criminal prosecution that could result in the "loss of, liberty". of the
accused).
10. 236 So. 2d at 444.
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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the state court, rejecting
the premise that because crimes involving a maximum punishment of
six months can be tried without a jury, they can also be tried without
the assistance of counsel."' Instead of limiting Powell v. Alabama12 and
Gideon13 to the particular offense, the dicta of these opinions were
read as relevant to any criminal prosecution.' 4 The Court found that
interests adversely affected by the loss of liberty and the accused's right
to an impartial proceeding outweigh any strain that would be impressed
upon legal resources by an expanded system of appointed counsel.' 5
The all-encompassing nature of the sixth amendment has been slow
to emerge. The common law had accepted the anomaly of providing
counsel for misdemeanants while failing to offer the same protection to
felons. Long ago the Supreme Court asserted, however, that the adop-
tion of the sixth amendment was an unqualified rejection of the limit-
ation that the common law imposed upon the right to counsel, yet
there is nothing in the history or intent of the Framers to suggest that
the constitutional guarantee anticipated the derogation of the right as
it had existed at common law.' 6 The due process implications were
first discussed in Powell." The Powell defendants were given neither
time to secure counsel nor an opportunity to consult with their attor-
ney who was a late appointment and who failed to function as an effec-
tive advocate.' 8 Mr. Justice Sutherland framed the issue before the
Court not in terms of whether the sixth amendment contemplated ap-
pointment at public expense or the right of each defendant to retain
counsel for his defense, but rather in terms of the positive duties that
11. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,29 (1972).
12. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In Powell, seven Negroes were charged with the rape of two
white girls on a freight train near Scottsboro, Alabama. The defendants were brought to
trial amidst an atmosphere of great public outrage that necessitated military protection.
13. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
14. 407 U.S. at 32.
15. Id. at 34-37. The Court specifically mentioned the complexity of the rules of
evidence, constitutional issues, ascertainment and presentation of defenses, and the increas-
ing number of guilty pleas as being the most serious, for they involve a waiver of the
right against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right to confront wit-
nesses. It is also apparent that the probability of these difficulties arising for the unaided
layman is not related to the gravity of the charge, or the maximum punishment.
16. 287 U.S. at 61-65. The Court in Powell, in its presentation of the right to counsel
as it existed in the colonies prior to the adoption of the Constitution, failed to differentiate
between the right to employ counsel at private expense, and the right to request appointed
counsel at public expense. The Court's holding encompassed both aspects. However, the
Court, unlike the decision in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), which used the latter
aspect as the historic basis for the denial of assistance, failed to deal with the contention
that the two situations present different due process issues.
17. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
18. Id. at 49-56.
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fourteenth amendment due process imposes upon the criminal justice
system when an indigent appears unrepresented.' 9 The Supreme Court
reversed the conviction, noting that the proceeding was fundamentally
unfair in two respects. The lower court had ignored the mandates of
due process by neither affording the defendants an opportunity to se-
cure counsel nor appointing counsel in light of the defendants'
indigency.20
Since Powell was decided before Palko v. Connecticut,21 which was
the first instance in which the Court expressed support for selective in-
corporation, the approach was necessarily limited to the mechanism
and requirements of fourteenth amendment due process.22 Powell had
to be structured around notions of fundamental fairness which forced
the Court to weigh surrounding circumstances.23 There was simply no
existing understanding of due process by which the Court could have
declared that the denial of the assistance of counsel in a capital case, 24
let alone any criminal prosecution, was a per se violation of due proc-
ess. Prejudice had to be established through circumstances.2 5 Yet the
impetus of the Powell decision clearly applies to any criminal prosecu-
tion. The inability of one unskilled in the science of law to judge the
validity of the indictment, the relevancy of evidence, the consequences
of a plea of guilty and his incompetence to ascertain and present an
available defense should eliminate any question regarding the fair-
ness of the proceeding.26 Although the Court in Powell narrowed the
impact of the holding by making collateral circumstances determinative
19. Id. at 60.
20. Id. at 71.
21. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
22. See Chicago, Burlington & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). One of the principal obstacles confronting the Court in
Powell was the understanding in Hurtado that if the fourteenth amendment was intended
to perpetuate some of the specific guarantees of the first eight amendments, it could do
so only by specific inclusion, not through the implications of due process of law. The
Court concluded that there must be exceptions to this rule when the right is a fundamental
principle of liberty and justice. If this is so, then the right is protected against state
action because it is embraced within the fourteenth amendment due process clause. The
Court confined itself to this approach of necessity for it was an infringement on the
sovereignity of the states.
23. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
24. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961). The Court finally declared that there
was a flat requirement of appointed counsel in capital cases.
25. Indicative of the Court's approach when dealing with a federal controversy is
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), in which the Court declared that failure to comply
with the sixth amendment mandate of the assistance of counsel voids federal jurisdiction
of the court regardless of the circumstances. The Court further stated than when state
action is involved, an examination of circumstances to establish unfairness is the only way
of being responsive to the issue presented.
26. 287 U.S. at 68-69.
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of the issue of fairness, 27 at a higher level of abstraction the Court sug-
gests that the denial of counsel is an infringement of due process at
least in capital prosecutions and possibly in less serious ones.
28
In Betts v. Brady,29 the petitioner, who had been convicted of a
felony, urged that the prior decisions of the Court required the ap-
pointment of counsel regardless of circumstances.30 The Court re-
sponded that this was a misreading of Powell for that decision was the
precursor of the "special circumstances" standard. 31 The Court looked
to the totality of the circumstances and agreed with the lower court
that the absence of counsel did not render the proceeding fundament-
ally unfair and that his presence would not have changed the outcome
of the trial.3 2 This rule was eventually discarded in Gideon, for Gideon
ignored the conclusions of Powell concerning the fundamental nature
of the right to counsel.33
For some reason the rights to counsel and to a jury trial have been
measured by a different standard from that applicable to other guar-
antees of the sixth amendment.8 4 None of the other guarantees of the
sixth amendment except the rights to counsel and to a jury trial have
been dependent upon the type of proceeding or the seriousness of the
offense in either federal or state courts. 3 5 In Argersinger, the Court re-
27. Id. at 45.
28. See Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. REv. 685
(1968).
29. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
30. Id. at 462.
31. Id. at 463. In its historic analysis, the Court made the distinction between the right
to employ counsel at private expense and the right to request appointed counsel at public
expense, which was not dealt with in Powell, and reached the conclusion that appointed
counsel was not so fundamental as to be included in due process. The "special circum-
stances" standard assumed that due process required appointment of counsel only in those
cases in which it appeared from an examination of the totality of the facts that the ac-
cused's trial would be fundamentally unfair without counsel's assistance.
32. Id. at 472-73.
33. 372 U.S. at 344. The "special circumstances" standard was eventually discarded
for it entailed a retrospective approach to due process. Procedural safe-guards are insti-
tuted to insure the fairness of the proceeding prospectively. When a court approaches due
process from the view that an individual can be denied rights, except in those cases in
which judicial hindsight exposes unfairness, the whole rationale of the rule of law is
defeated. See W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 163 (1955).
34. The decisions that followed the implications of Gideon intially extended counsel
to all misdemeanants. See Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965). Some of the
courts withdrew from this position and began to apply a standard similar to the special
circumstances of Betts in regard to misdemeanants. Others applied the petty offense
standard as annunciated in 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970). See Brinson v. Florida, 273 F. Supp.
840 (S.D. Fla. 1967). The most recent approach was taken in James v. Headley, 410 F.2d
325 (5th Cir. 1969), which suggested the utilization of the "loss of liberty" and "special
circumstances" standards. See generally Comment, The Right to Counsel: The Impact of
Gideon v. Wainwright in the Fifty States, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 103 (1970).
35. 407 U.S. at 27-28.
119
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 12: 115, 1973
jected the lower court's equating of the right to counsel with the right
to a jury trial.86 The Court noted that the rights were of separate origin,
the latter having a valid historic basis, the former being a rejection of
the common law understanding.37 Furthermore, they serve different
purposes. The belief expressed in Duncan v. Louisiana,3s was that some
instrumentality had to be imposed between contending parties to pre-
vent the abuse of official power. If the offense was serious enough, the
defendant had the right to prefer the judgment of a jury of his peers
who would prove more sensitive than the overzealous prosecutor or
the biased judge.3 9 The right to a jury trial was a recognition that
official power is easily abused when entrusted in a few hands.40 Yet the
decision in Duncan4l received prospective application 42 since it could
not be said that a trial before a judge was fundamentally unfair in all
cases. 43 However, Gideon was given full retroactive application, 44 which
would seem to reflect the more fundamental nature of the right to
counsel.
The assistance of counsel, on the other hand, was designed to achieve
36. Id. at 25.
37. Id. at 30. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Offenses and the Constitutional Guar-
anty of Trial by Jury, 39 HAitv. L. REv. 917 (1926). When the Constitution was adopted,
the origins of the right to a jury trial could be traced to the practices that existed at
common law. The denial of a jury trial at common law for petty offenses is often cited
as a justification for the present limitations on the right. However, when the right to
counsel was adopted, it was a rejection of the limitations as they had existed at common
law, divorcing the right from its historic ties. The right to counsel was not premised on
the practices of the common law. See Holden v. Hardy. 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
38. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The petitioner, a Negro, noticed his cousins talking with a
group of white boys. There had been racial incidents at their school and the petitioner
suggested that his cousins leave with him. The white boys testified that just before leav-
ing the petitioner slapped one of the white boys. He was charged with simple battery, a
misdemeanor under Louisiana law punishable by two years imprisonment and a $300
fine. He was convicted and sentenced to serve 60 days and pay a fine of $150.
39. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
40. 391 U.S. at 156.
41. Id. at 145.
42. See DeStenfano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
43. Id. at 634. Whenever a new constitutional rule is adopted that significantly im-
proves the pre-existing fact-finding prcoedures, it receives full retroactive effect whether
the case is before the Court on direct, or habeas corpus review. There are traditionally
three criteria that determine the retroactivity of a new constitutional rule. They are the
purpose to be served by the new standard, the extent of the reliance by law enforcement
officials on the old standard, and the burden on the administration of justice of the retro-
active application of the new standard. The latter criteria are applicable when the effect
of the new standard is not to substantially alter the reliability of the fact-finding process.
Gideon was given full retroactive effect because it was within the scope of the former test
while Duncan was applied prospectively since there would be no measurable improvement
in the fact-finding process on retrial. There was also justifiable reliance on the lack of
the applicability of the sixth amendment to the states and there would be a significant
adverse effect on the administration of justice. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244
(1969).
44. See Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2 (1963).
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a balance of power between the skills of prosecution and defense.45
The intricate defensive weapons available in a judicial proceeding were
fashioned not for the inarticulate layman but for competent coun-
sel.46 As the circuit court in James v. Headley47 noted, when the de-
fendant is left to his own resources, his fate depends not on his guilt
or innocence but on an unequal struggle of wits. The argument that
the prosecutor and judge can protect the rights of the unrepresented
defendant ignores the adversary basis of our system of criminal justice.48
When an indigent can be tried without a jury, the only available safe-
guard of the indigent's rights is appointed counsel. 49
No decision of the Court, prior to Argersinger, more closely ap-
proaches the "loss of liberty" standard than In re Gault.50 Gault was
charged with an offense which would have been punishable by a fine
of $50 or imprisonment for less than two months if he had not been a
minor.51 The petitioner, however, only fifteen, was adjudged a juvenile
delinquent and sentenced to serve the remainder of his minority (six
years) in a state institution.52 Admittedly, a decision that a minor is
delinquent usually results in his incarceration for a substantial period
and so this apparent extension of the right to counsel is really no more
than an application of the "felony" standard of Gideon.5 3 Nevertheless,
the Court analogized this proceeding to the criminal prosecution which
would have occurred if petitioner had not been a minor. 54 The Court
did not decide that counsel was essential because of the severity of the
sentence but rather counsel was necessary "to cope with the problems of
law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon the regular-
ity of the proceeding, to ascertain whether the defendant has a defense
45. 410 F.2d at 333.
46. 372 U.S. at 344. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1937).
47. 410 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969).
48. 287 U.S. at 61.
49. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (New York could not try a defendant
who faced imprisonment for more than six months without a jury). Since certain misde-
meanors were punishable by more than six months imprisonment, the defendant faced the
possibilty of presenting his case to a jury without the aid of counsel. Needless to say, this
is a difficult task and denies the defendant's right to exercise in his behalf the considera-
tions that prompted the decision in Duncan. Having emasculated the right to a jury trial
for the indigent misdemeanant, the only solution was to appoint counsel.
50. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
51. Id. at 8-9.
52. Id. at 7-8.
53. The Court noted that the confinement is for the period of the child's minority but
since jurisdiction is limited to persons under the age of eighteen, the sentence is usually
for a period in excess of three years. See 372 U.S. at 335.
54. 387 U.S. at 36.
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and to prepare and submit it."55 Without specifying the required
length of the loss of liberty, the Court held that in any proceeding in
which a juvenile's freedom may be curtailed, counsel must be ap-
pointed for the indigent youth. 56 In these two respects, that a misde-
meanor prosecution is not inherently less complicated than a felony, and
that the use of broad categories of offenses to determine the applicabil-
ity of the right to counsel do not coincide with the scope of due proc-
ess, Gault undermined the Court's previous method of expansion of
this sixth amendment guarantee in degrees.
Since Powell, the Court has been approaching the "all criminal
prosecutions" standard explicit in the sixth amendment.67 In Arger-
singer, it was the conclusion of the Court that the paramount interests
of the accused do not arise until he faces a loss of liberty. This stand-
ard involves a discrimination between deprivations of liberty and prop-
erty with respect to a fundamental right. The "special circumstances"
and "felony standards have been rejected either because the distinc-
tions that they drew were impermissible or because they bore no rela-
tion to the interests that counsel was designed to protect. A similar
situation arose in Douglas v. California5 8 in which the state maintained
a different appellate procedure for indigents. Instead of appointing
counsel to assist in these appeals, the appellate court conducted an in-
dependent review of the trial record to determine whether counsel
would be helpful in prosecuting the appeal, in effect, to determine
whether there was any merit in the appeal. 9 The Court found the
procedure violative of the equal protection clause declaring that jus-
tice is not preserved when the rich can compel a court to listen to their
arguments while the poor cannot.6 0 Although the Court has never
specifically referred to Douglas in any right to counsel decision, the
equal protection rationale can be easily analogized to the right to
55. Id.
56. Id. at 41.
57. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
58. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 355.
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counsel standards.61 There is no equal justice when the kind of trial a
man enjoys depends on the amount of money he has. To some extent
the failure to expand the right to counsel has been a function of cost
rather than the result of difficulty in defining the requirements of due
process.6 2 But that perspective overlooks the due process issue for it
focuses attention on whether the state can afford the expense, not
whether the defendant, as a layman, has sufficient skills to defend him-
self.6 3 If the layman cannot adequately defend himself and the state
justifies the denial of counsel not on due process grounds but on a
fiscal basis, the resulting classification would seem to be impermissible
under Douglas.
In Argersinger, the Court erects a standard, the "loss of liberty",
that distinguishes between deprivations of property and liberty. In its
opinion the Court looked to the requirement of fairness, the inade-
quacies of the layman, the complexity of the issues and the interests of
the defendant that can be forfeited or jeopardized even in the context
of a misdemeanor. Yet the new standard is unresponsive to at least
three of the foregoing requirements. The Court implies that the inter-
ests of a defendant who suffers a loss of property are of less consequence
than a defendant who suffers a loss of liberty.64 In Mayer v. Chicago,65
the respondent argued that it could discriminate in the distribution of
free trial transcript between defendants who are fined and those who
are imprisoned, for the fiscal interests of the state outweigh the inter-
ests of the former in burdening the appellate process. 66 The Court re-
61. See Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings
and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REV. 1, 7-14 (1963).
62. If one compares the rationales of Powell, Gideon, and Argersinger, little has emerged
from the earliest decision that expands upon the fundamental nature of the right to
counsel. The relationship between due process and the right to counsel was conclusively
defined in Powell. Nevertheless it has taken the Court thirty years to conclude that in
capital and felony cases there cannot be a fair proceeding without the assistance of counsel.
Like the right to a jury trial, the right to counsel entails substantial expenditures on the
segement of the population that contributes least to the public coffer. Perhaps the re-
minder of Justice Traynor in People v. Brown, 55 Cal. 2d 64, 357 P.2d 1072, 9 Cal. Rptr.
816 (1960), is appropriate:
A court does not suddenly become omniscent when the appellant proves impecunious.
Id. at 70, 357 P.2d at 1077, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
63. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 682 (1948).
64. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
Since indigents can no longer be imprisoned for failing to pay a fine either when the
only statutory penalty is a fine or when failure imposes a punishment longer than the
maximum statutory period, perhaps the Court feels that there has been achieved a balance
between the rights of the defendant and the public treasuries. It is interesting to note
that the Court in Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), rejected the notion of balancing
in regard to the fundamental rights of the sixth amendment.
65. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
66. Id. at 196.
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plied that this differentiation misconceives the impact of Griffin and
Douglas for the question is not one of balance but of prohibition
against any procedure that deprives one of due process solely because
of poverty.67
The right to counsel is the operative provision of the sixth amend-
ment for through it the other safeguards are effectuated. Its operation
also extends beyond the scope of the amendment to preserving a trial
record for appeal. Yet in comparing Argersinger and Mayer, the Court
says that states cannot deny an indigent misdemeanant who was only
fined the mechanism for bringing an appeal, nevertheless the Court
agrees that states can deny the similarly situated defendant representa-
tion by counsel, which is the means of preserving an appealable record.
States can no longer establish procedures that prevent the indigent
from receiving a transcript of his trial or assistance of counsel on ap-
peal. It seems that the Court has chosen a standard that holds justice
in abeyance for this class of defendants who are faced with the same
legal complexities and inadequacies while providing assistance to in-
terpret a barren record.
Eventually the Court will have to integrate the equal protection and
right to counsel decisions for there is a growing friction between them.
Since the Court seems reluctant to extend the right to counsel to all
criminal prosecutions, the present standard will prove unresponsive to
the plight of individuals who face substantial injury yet no imprison-
ment. Most probably discretion will have to be vested in trial judges
to appoint counsel in situations not involving the loss of liberty ac-
cording to a "special circumstance" rule similar to that of Betts v.
Brady.68
Robert B. Evanick
67. Id. at 197.
68. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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